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REFLECTIONS ON HOFFHEIMER’S THE STEALTH
REVOLUTION IN PERSONAL JURISDICTION
Michael Vitiello*
The Supreme Court did not grant review in a case involving personal
jurisdiction between 1990 and 2010 at a time when our world flattened.1
Since then, the Court has decided six cases. In each, the Court has found
that the assertion of jurisdiction violated due process.2 Several scholars,
including Professor Hoffheimer, have called into question the Court’s
begrudging approach to due process.3 Indeed, in an era when Americans
are increasingly likely to be involved in interstate or international
transactions, the Court’s jurisdiction-vanishing act is deeply troubling.4
In earlier scholarship, Professor Hoffheimer has taken the Court to
task for narrowing access to federal court.5 For example, he and his coauthor Professor Judy Cornett argued that the Court’s new general
jurisdiction test dramatically changed the law, giving corporate
defendants the ability to challenge jurisdiction in cases where jurisdiction
would have been presumed prior to the Court’s begrudging new
approach.6
In The Stealth Revolution in Personal Jurisdiction,7 Professor
Hoffheimer returns to the Court’s personal jurisdiction case law in light
of Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Superior Court (BMS),8 yet another
* Distinguished Professor of Law, the University of Pacific, McGeorge School of Law;
University of Pennsylvania, J.D. 1974; Swarthmore College, B.A., 1969. I want to extend my
thanks to my research assistant Dylan Marques for his assistance with the footnotes for this paper.
1. Michael H. Hoffheimer, The Stealth Revolution in Personal Jurisdiction, 70 FLA. L.
REV. 499, 501 (2018). The reference to our flattened world is to Thomas Friedman’s book from
over a decade ago, entitled The World is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-first Century, in
which he recounted and touted the ways in which technology has interconnected people around
the globe.
2. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court (Bristol-Myers III), 137 S. Ct. 1773,
1783–84 (2017); BNSF Ry. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1559–60 (2017); Walden v. Fiore, 571
U.S. 277, 291 (2014); Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 142 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop Tires
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 929–30 (2011); J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro,
564 U.S. 873, 887 (2011).
3. See, e.g., Judy M. Cornett & Michael H. Hoffheimer, Good-Bye Significant Contacts:
General Personal Jurisdiction After Daimler AG v. Bauman, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 101 (2015); Donald
L. Doernberg, Resoling International Shoe, 2 TEX. A&M L. REV. 247 (2014); Tanya J. Monestier,
Registration Statutes, General Jurisdiction, and the Fallacy of Consent, 36 CARDOZO L. REV.
1343 (2015); Michael H. Hoffheimer, General Personal Jurisdiction After Goodyear Dunlop
Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 60 KAN. L. REV. 549 (2012) [hereinafter Hoffheimer, After
Goodyear]; MICHAEL VITIELLO, ANIMATING CIVIL PROCEDURE (2017).
4. See VITIELLO, supra note 3, at 69.
5. See Cornett & Hoffheimer, supra note 3, at 107; Hoffheimer, After Goodyear, supra
note 3, at 607.
6. Cornett & Hoffheimer, supra note 3, at 111–13.
7. Hoffheimer, supra note 1, at 504.
8. 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017).
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jurisdiction-denying case. Here, Professor Hoffheimer does not merely
repeat the previous critique, but has focused on another problem with the
Court’s new due process analysis: the Court acts as if it is merely
applying well-settled principles, when that is far from the truth.9 As
Professor Hoffheimer develops,10 that is a false narrative.
At the core of The Stealth Revolution are two important insights: the
Court has created “a narrative of lower court intransigence that devalues
the contributions of lower court judges and erodes confidence in the
courts.”11 Further, “the Court is implementing radical law reform without
the hard work of constructing persuasive explanations that ground a new
vision of personal jurisdiction in firm constitutional principle and
appropriate social policy analysis.”12
Below, I first discuss in broad strokes Professor Hoffheimer’s analysis
and why it is an important contribution to the literature. Thereafter, I
explore some questions that Professor Hoffheimer alluded to, but did not
address head-on. Indeed, my hope is that he will turn his critical eye to
those questions in the future.
PART ONE: IDENTIFYING THE COURT’S STEALTH REVOLUTION
Bristol-Myers Squibb (BMS) is one of the largest pharmaceutical
companies in the world. While its state of incorporation is Delaware and
its principal place of business either in New York or New Jersey, it has
extensive operations in California.13 Apart from substantial bricks and
mortar in California, over a seven year period, BMS sold over $900
million from the sale of Plavix in that state.14 Not surprisingly, when
reports surfaced that Plavix was not safe, a number of California plaintiffs
filed action against BMS in California state courts.15 Numerous plaintiffs
from other states also filed suit in California.16 A total of 678 plaintiffs
filed actions, which were then consolidated.17 The plaintiffs filed their
actions in March, 2012.18 BMS challenged the assertion of jurisdiction
with regards to the out-of-state plaintiffs.19
At the time of filing, the Supreme Court had created some uncertainty
about the rules governing general jurisdiction. In Goodyear Dunlop Tires
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
2016).
18.
19.

Hoffheimer, supra note 1, at 504.
See id.
Id. at 505.
Id.
See Bristol-Myers III, 137 S. Ct. at 1777–78.
Id. at 1778.
Id.
Id.
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court (Bristol-Myers II), 377 P.3d 874, 878 (Cal.
Id. at 877.
Id. at 878.
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Operations, S.A. v Brown,20 the Court suggested a significantly new
approach to general jurisdiction.21 Although technically not necessary to
the decision, Justice Ginsburg stated that general jurisdiction is almost
certainly proper only in a corporation’s state of incorporation or principal
place of business.22
Narrowing the scope of general jurisdiction in such a manner would
work a major change to prevailing approaches of lower courts. An
occasional court narrowed general jurisdiction as suggested by Justice
Ginsburg.23 But most courts focused on earlier Supreme Court cases and
upheld general jurisdiction when a corporate defendant’s contacts with
the forum state were continuous and systematic24 or when the contacts
were continuous and systematic and the assertion of jurisdiction was not
otherwise unreasonable.25 Any doubts about the Court’s commitment to
Goodyear’s dicta ended with Daimler AG v. Bauman.26
Daimler involved efforts of Argentine plaintiffs harmed during that
country’s dirty wars to sue Daimler in the United States for their harm.27
The Court was unanimous, with only Justice Sotomayor questioning the
Court’s new general jurisdiction holding.28 She pointed to the widely held
view that general jurisdiction was proper based on the corporation’s
extensive business in the forum state and suggested that general
jurisdiction was not proper because the traditional reasonableness factors
weighed against jurisdiction.29 She also urged that dismissal of the action
was proper by application of forum non conveniens.30 In the majority
opinion, Justice Ginsburg reiterated Goodyear’s dicta, now necessary for
the decision that, except in an unspecified extreme case, a corporate
defendant is “at home” (i.e., subject to suit when the claim is unrelated to
the forum contacts) in its state of incorporation and principal place of
business.31
BMS demonstrates the profound change in the law. Given its extensive
contacts with California, BMS could barely contend that it lacked
continuous and systematic contacts with California. Further, at oral
argument, its counsel conceded that defending the suit in California was
20. 564 U.S. 915 (2011).
21. Id. at 924.
22. Id.
23. Charles W. "Rocky" Rhodes, Clarifying General Jurisdiction, 34 SETON HALL L. REV.
807, 829–55 (2005).
24. Id. at 813.
25. Id. at 816.
26. 571 US 117 (2014).
27. Id. at 121.
28. Id. at 142–60. (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
29. Id. at 145–46.
30. Id. at 156.
31. Id. at 122 (majority opinion).
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not burdensome.32
Because general jurisdiction was not available, the out-of-state
plaintiffs had to shift their argument, attempting to demonstrate that their
claim related to the California plaintiffs’ claims and the defendant’s
California conduct.33 Justice Alito, speaking for 8 justices, was having
none of it. He accused the California Supreme Court of attempting to use
a sliding scale of contacts as an indirect effort to circumvent the Court’s
new general jurisdiction requirements.34 While citing the oft-repeated
language from earlier Court decisions that a claim must arise out of “or
relate” to the defendant’s conduct with the forum, he did little to explain
the Court’s conclusion that the out-of-state plaintiffs’ claim was unrelated
to forum activity.35 As Professor Hoffheimer points out, “In holding that
the case was resolved by precedent, [Justice Alito] avoids explaining
what purpose the relatedness requirement serves and what additional
facts would satisfy the relatedness requirement.”36 According to Justice
Alito, the outcome in BMS flows from a “straightforward application . . .
of settled principles of personal jurisdiction.”37 Indeed, as Professor
Hoffheimer mentions in passing, the Court attempted to explain its
holding, in part, by discussing state sovereignty as an explanation for why
contacts with the forum state prevail even in a case where the defendant
admitted that defending suit in the forum state was not burdensome.38
After reviewing Justice Sotomayor’s lone dissent, “A Voice in the
Wilderness,”39 Professor Hoffheimer sliced and diced how Justice Alito’s
opinion did not, in fact, rely on settled precedent or offer a clear rule of
decision or explain the policies that justified its holding.40 Professor
Hoffheimer’s discussion focuses on a number of problems with the
majority opinion. For example, he discusses historical antecedents, cases
under which jurisdiction would be proper in a case like BMS.41 He
identified doctrines like pendent personal jurisdiction that have been
32. Andrew D. Bradt & D. Theodore Rave, Aggregation on Defendants’ Terms: BristolMyers Squibb and the Federalization of Mass-Tort Litigation, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1251, 1277 (2018).
33. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court (Bristol-Myers II), 377 P.3d 874, 888 (Cal.
2016).
34. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court (Bristol-Myers III), 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1778–
79 (2017).
35. Hoffheimer, supra note 1, at 518.
36. Id. at 519. Justice Alito did not hold that all claims must directly arise from the
defendant’s forum activity to satisfy due process in a specific jurisdiction case. But there is a
strong hint to that effect. Despite a long line of cases stating that a claim must arise out of or relate
to the defendant’s forum activity, the Court may be willing to abandon such a requirement, again
narrowing specific jurisdiction.
37. Id. at 520 (quoting Bristol-Myers III, 137 S. Ct. at 1783).
38. Id. at 523.
39. Id. at 521.
40. Id. at 524.
41. Id. at 527–29.
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widely accepted as well as a much broader application of general
jurisdiction principles.42 He also took the Court to task for failure to
explain what additional facts would support a finding that the out-of-state
plaintiffs’ claims were sufficiently related to justify hearing those
claims.43
Not only did the BMS Court ignore precedent, it also created a
“Narrative of Lower Court Intransigence.”44 Professor Hoffheimer
argues that the Court has failed in BMS and elsewhere “to acknowledge
the legal indeterminacy that lower courts face and, accordingly, fail[ed]
to recognize the value of the lower courts’ efforts to achieve just results.
[Opinions like BMS] promote the view that the lower courts are failing to
apply settled law.”45
Importantly, Professor Hoffheimer explored the costs of the Court’s
“stealth revolution.”46 The Court’s reliance on its mantra that it is
applying settled precedent may explain its failure to offer an explanation
for its constriction of personal jurisdiction.47 Beyond a need to understand
the rationality of the Court’s holdings, lower courts are also left with little
guidance.48
Towards the end of his article, Professor Hoffheimer addresses in
passing concerns that the Court, at least the right wing of the Court, is
restricting jurisdiction to advance a pro-corporate bias.49 He ends his
article with a call for greater transparency, in effect, to restore confidence
in the Court’s current jurisprudence.50
The Stealth Revolution makes a compelling case against the Court’s
recent personal jurisdiction case law. The critique of BMS is especially
sharp. But as I develop below, because of Professor Hoffheimer’s
important insights into the Court’s due process jurisprudence, I wish that
he had explored the Court’s motivations more fully.
PART TWO: SOVEREIGNTY AND CORPORATE BIAS AND MORE
A. Minimum Contacts and Sovereignty
Professor Hoffheimer discusses Justice Alito’s reliance on

42. Id. at 528.
43. Id. at 529. Professor Hoffheimer then addressed a series of specific “mysteries” about
the majority opinion including missing cases, problematic precedent, missing methodology, and
sister-state sovereign interests. Id. at 524.
44. Id. at 542.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 546–49.
47. See id.
48. See id. at 546–47.
49. Id. at 548.
50. Id. at 551–52.
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sovereignty in passing.51 He might have explored the Court’s willingness
to rely on sovereignty in much more depth. It underscores his thesis in
neon lights.
The role of sovereignty in due process analysis dates back to Pennoyer
v. Neff.52 There, in explaining why a plaintiff beginning suit in personam
must serve a non-consenting non-resident defendant in-hand and in-state,
the Court discussed the relevance of the recently enacted Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.53 In dicta, the Court explained that
a court should not honor a judgment if the original defendant’s due
process rights were violated in the earlier lawsuit.54 The underlying
theory was that the Fourteenth Amendment protected one sovereign
state’s power from overreaching by another state.55
Pennoyer made no sense as an interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which was a limitation on states’ power and an assertion of
individuals’ rights against the state. The idea, post-Civil War, of the
amendment reinforcing sovereign rights was just wrong.56 Indeed, the
Court would later call the idea a “shibboleth.”57
Modern due process cases eroded any theory of sovereignty until
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson.58 There, while disclaiming
adherence to Pennoyer, Justice White tried to explain why the assertion
of jurisdiction over two of the defendants violated Due Process, without
even considering the reasonableness of asserting jurisdiction in the forum
state.59 He explained that the threshold question was whether a defendant
acted with purpose in creating a contact with the forum state.60 The
contacts analysis served federalism interests: i.e., sovereignty still
mattered.61
That assertion hit the procedural world with a thud. Justice White’s
opinion raised a number of important questions. If the contacts part of the
Court’s due process analysis protects sovereign interests, how can a
private litigant waive her due process challenge to the assertion of
jurisdiction?62 How does the text of the Fourteenth Amendment, referring
to an individual’s liberty interest that can be denied only after the state
provides due process, support a conclusion that the amendment has
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 539–40.
95 U.S. 714 (1877).
Id. at 733.
Id.
Id.
VITIELLO, supra note 3, at 22–23.
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980).
444 U.S. 286 (1980). See VITIELLO, supra note 3, at 33–37.
See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 292–95.
Id. at 297–98.
Id.
VITIELLO, supra note 3, at 35–36.
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anything to do with supporting sovereign rights?63
So obvious was the lack of support for Justice White’s assertion that
he did a mea culpa two years later. In Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v.
Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee,64 Justice White confessed his
mistake: due process “protects an individual liberty interest. It represents
a restriction on judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a
matter of individual liberty.”65
Despite that recognition and quick repudiation of a theoretical
justification for narrowing personal jurisdiction, Justice Alito blithely
relied on sovereignty as relevant to the Court’s due process analysis.66 He
did so for eight justices and did so without offering any new justification
for relying on a theory soundly discredited.67
Professor Hoffheimer had plenty of fodder to prove his overall thesis.
Although the example that I have highlighted seems to be especially
egregious. Indeed, as I develop below, I wish that Professor Hoffheimer
had speculated why members of the Court, except for Justice Sotomayor,
would not raise objections to Justice Alito’s reliance on what the Court
seems to have repudiated so resoundingly.
B. Professor Hoffheimer’s Next Article? Or So I Hope
Towards the end of Professor Hoffheimer’s article, he alludes to the
criticisms offered by some of us that the right wing of the Court
demonstrates a pro-corporate bias.68 Indeed, elsewhere, he has developed
ways in which the Court’s new personal jurisdiction has provided benefits
to defendants that cannot be explained by neutral principles.69 Less clear
are the principles animating the more liberal justices who have joined or
written jurisdiction-narrowing opinions. Here, I pick up on those themes
and examine a topic that I wish that he had addressed in more detail in
The Stealth Revolution. Alternatively, I would urge him to explore the
questions raised below when he next addresses the Court’s due process
analysis.
Consider modern commerce and travel. The ease of modern travel and
communication, along with open borders, have increased the chances for
Americans to become involved in disputes that cross state and

63. Id.
64. 456 U.S. 694 (1982).
65. Id. at 702.
66. Hoffheimer, supra note 1, at 539–40.
67. See id.
68. Id. at 548.
69. See Cornett & Hoffheimer, supra note 3, at 138; Hoffheimer, After Goodyear, supra
note 3, at 583.
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international borders.70 A century ago, when interstate travel increased
such disputes, the Court abandoned nineteenth century rigid rules,
allowing plaintiffs the opportunity to litigate in a convenient forum. 71 A
unanimous Court in McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.72
recognized the trend unabashedly.73 After reviewing its case law, which
expanded states’ jurisdictional reach, the Court explained why:
In part this is attributable to the fundamental
transformation of our national economy over the years.
Today many commercial transactions touch two or more
States and may involve parties separated by the full
continent. With this increasing nationalization of commerce
has come a great increase in the amount of business
conducted by mail across state lines. At the same time
modern transportation and communication have made it
much less burdensome for a party sued to defend himself in
a State where he engages in economic activity.74
In such a world, a defendant could hardly claim that responding to a
suit was unduly burdensome.75 Much of the Court’s analysis equated due
process with the fair notice and the opportunity to be heard.76 State
borders seemed to have little importance.77
Fast-forward to the twenty-first century and you find the Court
consistently closing the courthouse door.78 As I have argued elsewhere,
the right wing of the Court has demonstrated a pro-corporate defendant
bias.79 Professor Hoffheimer agrees with that conclusion, I believe.
70. See Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 617 (1990) (“In the late 19th and
early 20th centuries, changes in the technology of transportation and communication, and the
tremendous growth of interstate business activity, led to an ‘inevitable relaxation of the strict
limits on state jurisdiction’ over nonresident individuals and corporations.” (quoting Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 260 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting)).
71. See id.; see also Hess v. Palowski, 274 U.S. 352, 356–57 (1927); Kane v. New Jersey,
242 U.S. 160, 162 (1916).
72. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 219–20 (1957).
75. Accord Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court (Bristol-Myers II), 377 P.3d 874,
892 (Cal. 2016).
76. See McGee, 355 U.S. at 223–24.
77. See id.
78. See Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 291 (2014); Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117,
142 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 929–30 (2011); J.
McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 887 (2011); Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior
Court (Bristol-Myers III), 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1783–84 (2017); BNSF Ry. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549,
1559–60 (2017).
79. See VITIELLO, supra note 3, at 67–71; Michael Vitiello, Limiting Access to US Courts:
The Supreme Court’s New Personal Jurisdiction Case Law, 19 UC DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y
209, 267–68 (2015).
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What remains is a more difficult question, one that I hope Professor
Hoffheimer will address in the future: why is the more liberal wing of the
Court, sans Justice Sotomayor, willing to join the right wing of the Court
in narrowing access to justice?
Elsewhere, I have explored Justice Ginsburg’s willingness to narrow
general jurisdiction in ways that make it almost a dead letter.80 I am
critical of Justice Ginsburg for narrowing general jurisdiction without
explaining the underlying policies for general jurisdiction. At the same
time, while she and other members of the more liberal wing of the Court
have voted consistently to narrow general jurisdiction, at least some of
the Justices seem interested in expanding specific jurisdiction.81 That may
leave some plaintiffs unable to join important parties; but specific
jurisdiction is often the best forum, given that the place of an accident,
for example, most often is the center of gravity of the litigation.
My theory that the more liberal wing of the Court was willing to
narrow general jurisdiction in favor of expanding specific jurisdiction is
open to question in light of Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan’s
willingness to join Justice Alito’s BMS opinion, and to do so, without
concurring to raise any questions about its odd reliance, for example, on
sovereignty.
As Professor Hoffheimer argues, finding that the California court’s
assertion of jurisdiction over BMS did not violate due process could have
been premised on existing specific jurisdiction case law.82 Or even if the
Court had not addressed this precise question in the past, extending
jurisdiction would have been based on specific jurisdiction.83 Thus,
whatever commitment that Justices Ginsburg, Breyer and Kagan may
have had to expanding specific jurisdiction, while narrowing general
jurisdiction, is not that strong.
Two scholars have argued that BMS may best be understood as a case
about forum-shopping. Professors Bradt and Rave argue in Aggregation
on Defendants’ Terms: Bristol-Myers Squibb and the Federalization of
Mass-Tort Litigation that BMS’s lasting impact is likely to be on “the
balance of power in complex litigation.”84 That may well be the case.
The various plaintiffs in BMS seemed to have outmaneuvered BMS
with effective forum shopping.85 By joining BMS’s California marketing
firm, the plaintiffs prevented removal to federal court.86 By filing
80. See VITIELLO, supra note 3, at 64–67.
81. See id.
82. Hoffheimer, supra note 1, at 503–04.
83. For example, the Justices might have adopted a liberal reading of “related to” the claim,
suggested by Justice Brennan in his dissenting opinion in Helicopteros. Helicopteros Nacionales
de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 425 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
84. Bradt & Rave, supra note 32 at 1256.
85. See id.
86. Id. at 1275.
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separately and moving to consolidate, the plaintiffs could try their cases
together, a procedural step that avoided attempting class certification.87
Had they joined in a class action, the defendants could have removed
under the Class Action Fairness Act,88 which allows removal even absent
complete diversity and even if a defendant is an in-state defendant.89
While the more liberal justices may have been concerned about forum
shopping, they did not offer that as a rationale for joining Justice Alito’s
opinion. Further, they have not explained why forum shopping is sinful.90
In a large federal system, some form of forum shopping is inevitable. If
BMS and other jurisdiction-narrowing cases reflect a bias against
plaintiffs’ forum shopping, the justices should make an effort to explain
the underlying principle. To date, they have not done so.
As indicated, The Stealth Revolution did not speculate about the kinds
of policy questions posed here. My hope is that Professor Hoffheimer,
expert in Civil Procedure and Conflicts of Law,91 will wade into that
morass. Given his considerable contribution to the personal jurisdiction
literature, his thoughts about possible policy explanations for the more
liberal justices’ acquiescence in BMS would be most welcome.

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id.
Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
Id.
VITIELLO, supra note 3, at 66–67.
See generally MICHAEL H. HOFFHEIMER, CONFLICT OF LAWS: EXAMPLES AND
EXPLANATIONS (3d ed. 2016); Michael H. Hoffheimer, Conflicting Rules of Interpretation and
Construction in Multi-Jurisdictional Disputes, 63 RUTGERS L. REV. 599 (2011); Michael H.
Hoffheimer, Mississippi Conflict of Laws, 67 MISS. L.J. 175 (1997).

